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ABSTRACT: 
Complementary currencies are usually seen as a by-product of collective movements for social change or 
as an institutional tool for local development: they are an outcome of collective action, not the origin of 
collective mobilisation. Empirical research on the Sardex complementary currency, though, suggests that 
money may support the emergence of collective action. 
Traditional economic theory considers any collective benefits provided by the economic system as the 
secondary effects of individual entrepreneurs seeking to maximise their profits. Entrepreneurs belonging 
to the Sardex network, though, do associate the use of the Sardex currency with direct collective benefits.  
This means they consider their business activities to be a form of collective action for promoting the com-
mon good of Sardinia's socio-economic development. Using the Sardex currency sets this collective action 
in motion: some Sardex members also work to expand the Sardex network without any expectation of 
economic gain.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In the mainstream economic approach, money, like other goods, is just a commodi-
ty that needs to circulate freely in the market: in the long term, market competition 
will always provide citizens with the best aggregate utility. Labour mobility and firms' 
struggles to survive market competition should provide the best possible outcomes for 
consumers and workers: prices will decrease, employment will increase and better-
quality products will emerge. Despite the apparent economic neutrality, this is clearly a 
political project for dealing with social inequalities that believes in the redistributive 
power of market competition. This project is linked to specific type of money affirmed 
with the national currencies that became increasingly dominant following the creation  
of nation-states. In this period, which was preceded by the co-existence of different 
currencies, the recently established sovereign authorities sought to centralise their 
power and affirm their exclusive right to issue a single currency (Helleiner 2003; 
Ingham 2004; Amato and Fantacci 2013; 2015). Currency experiments and innovations, 
though, have always existed, even in recent years. For example, 4,500 complementary 
currencies (CCs), community credit and alternative finance systems have emerged in 
the last thirty years (Blanc 2013; Servet 213), a large number of them in Europe. CCs 
usually arise in response to specific economic, social or environmental needs (Place 
and Bindewald 2015; Doria and Fantacci 2018) and carry with them expectations of po-
litical change. Unlike the many recent virtual currencies (e.g., Bitcoin), CCs do not as-
pire to replace the ordinary currency but "only" to fill gaps in the functioning of the or-
dinary currency with their utopian project (Dodd 2015). 
In the literature, CCs were usually studied in relation to specific development goals 
of local communities, e.g. economic development, wealth distribution, the environ-
ment, etc. In this context, CCs are seen as a by-product of a collective movement for 
social change or as an institutional tool for local development. Indeed, the economic 
field—and money in particular—is usually seen as a tool for collective action, but not as 
its origin. Popular forms of collective action in the economic field are boycotts, strikes, 
purchasing groups or CCs. Economic activism (Forno and Graziani 2014; Bosi and Zam-
poni 2015) is the framework within which such strategies are understood as a form of 
economic activity with clear political ends. Economic activism is usually seen as a by-
product of political mobilisation: individuals or institutions use economic tools to reach 
a predetermined set of goals.  
Relying on field research on the Sardex CC, this paper argues that money can also 
be a tool for enabling collective action oriented toward the production of common 
goods. When economic action is mediated by Sardex money, the actors' self-
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understanding of their economic activity shifts from selfish motivations to collective-
oriented motivations. This shift in personal beliefs also entails a change in economic 
behaviour: people decide to use Sardex because of their collective political ends. In a 
nutshell, research findings suggest a different way to undertake economic action and 
to generate collective action: traditional entrepreneurial utilitarianism is hybridised 
with an economic form of collective action which is generated by a specific form of 
money1. 
The next section provides a summary of the main theories and mechanisms that ex-
plain the emergence of collective action. The third section describes the Sardex CC, 
how it was founded and how it functions. The fourth and fifth sections set out the re-
search findings: they show how Sardex money shapes beliefs related to self-
understanding economic actions and how this self-understanding generates collective 
action. The conclusion discusses the contribution of the Sardex experience in the light 
of a general theory of collective action and money functioning. 
 
 
2. The mechanisms of collective action 
 
Collective action is an open concept that can be used to define many different social 
dynamics. Some scholars use the concept to refer to generic actions performed in a 
group or with other people, while social movement scholars traditionally associate the 
concept of collective action with extraordinary events (McAdam 1999 [1982]; della Por-
ta and Diani 2006), such as revolutions or protests. Here, we adopt a third option, 
where collective action is a social dynamic that sees individuals cooperating for a 
common goal. But, unlike other forms of cooperation, collective action is oriented to-
wards the production, regulation or request of a collective good (Baldassarri 2009: 391-
392). Social volunteering or participation in union activities may be seen as an example 
of ordinary collective action oriented towards the production of a collective good. A 
collective good differs from other goods because it can only be produced or managed 
collectively, individuals cannot produce or manage it. Ordinary forms of collective ac-
tion and extraordinary mobilisation or protests are social dynamics that may have very 
different origins, but both can be treated as a problem of social coordination that re-
quires a proper explanation.  
 
1 The paper is based on research presented in the book When Money Changes Society. The case of Sardex 
money as community (Bazzani 2020a), see in particular the sub-section 4.3.  
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The social science disciplines have developed explanations for the emergence of 
collective action that differ with regard to the situational context of the origin of collec-
tive action, its specific form and to the assumptions embodied in the explanatory mod-
els adopted. Different disciplines take different stances over the phenomena and, with-
in disciplines too, there are often different assumptions which cannot easily be merged 
and synthesized. The early classical sociologists anchored the emergence of collective 
action to the presence of social norms (Durkheim 1982 [1895]). Social norms pre-exist 
individual agency and channel individual and collective action. This position can hardly 
account for the very different types of collective action that take place every day and 
their co-existence. The rational-choice approach suggests that individual interest may 
well explain the emergence of collective action. Indeed, individuals may expect some 
rewards, in terms of reputation, personal identity or even direct economic gain from 
collective action (Elster 1989). According to this view, cooperative action oriented to-
ward a common goal is chosen by individuals who may also choose the free-rider op-
tion if it better serves their individual interest. Ostrom (1990) perceives that the con-
flict between individual and collective optimality makes it difficult to manage common-
pool resources. Natural resources, for example, can only be maintained in the long run 
through social coordination and by focusing on collective goals because any individual 
use reduces availability for others. The psychological tradition tends to further internal-
ise these problems of social coordination by considering the presence of stable psycho-
logical traits that may or may not favour the emergence of collective action (Stroebe 
and Frey 1982). 
In recent years, experimental approaches have provided new evidence which helps 
to explain the emergence of collective action. The one or more mechanisms that  bring 
about collective action may be difficult to identify in field research, but in a laboratory 
setting different mechanisms can be studied in isolation and different hypotheses re-
garding the emergence of collective action can be tested. This evidence is changing the 
scenario for explaining the emergence of collective action: the different assumptions 
underlying previous explanations can be tested and new hypotheses developed. Re-
search findings suggest that collective action emerges through a combination of very 
different generative mechanisms that neither exclude, nor confirm, any single mecha-
nism. Collective action can be generated by individual interest—confirming rational 
choice assumptions—and also by the presence of social norms. For example, in the 
case of one-shot interaction in Public Good Games, people may opt for behaviours that 
are not in line with rational choice assumptions. In such cases, people decide to give 
alter between 40% and 60% of their resources without any direct or indirect return 
(Ostrom 2000: 140). This happens even when ego does has no direct interaction with 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 13(1) 2020: 438-461, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v13i1p438 
  
442 
 
alter and obtains no direct advantage from this decision: this is not a strategic interac-
tion but a value-oriented type of social action. This type of collective orientation of so-
cial action is also evident in the presence of the desire that group members who break 
group rules be punished. People often choose to avoid the free-rider option even when 
they have no prior experience and do not expect subsequent involvement in that par-
ticular interaction. The possibility of direct communication and repeated interaction 
does, however, reinforce these tendencies to mutual commitment and it fosters coop-
eration (Baldassarri 2009, 2015). Face-to-face interaction increases the likelihood of 
social coordination, because it facilitates the sharing of opinions and the setting of a 
common goal.  
Even though the origin of collective action cannot be ultimately placed inside (inter-
est) or outside (norms) individuals, collective action and free-rider behaviour both con-
tinue to co-exist within the complex web of incentives and norms in the real world. The 
co-presence in the mechanisms of collective action of both individual interest and val-
ue-oriented action suggests that the focus of interest needs to be shifted from the 
origin of collective action to the contextual elements that may support the emergence 
of such behaviour. Understanding the emergence of collective action requires “the 
study of the contextual and institutional aspects that favour the emergence and 
maintenance of social norms [which become] central to the collective-action research 
agenda” (Baldassarri 2009: 401; Ostrom 1990; 2000). This perspective does not contest 
the validity of previous knowledge, but more interestingly, it requires previous 
knowledge to be considered as the building blocks of situational configurations of ele-
ments and mechanisms that bring about collective action (Olson 1965; Hardin 1982). 
According to Marx, for example, class struggle is possible only after the emergence of 
class per se. Class struggle is a form of collective action so its roots do not lie in individ-
ual propensities, or in specific social norms, but in structural forces (class in se) and 
class awareness (class per se), without which class struggle cannot take place. Collec-
tive action only emerges when a collective goal is identified as an individual goal. In this 
case, the key elements that bring about the mechanism of collective action are not its 
ultimate source (social structure), but the contextual elements that may or may not fa-
vour the formation of class awareness. Regarding these elements, social movement 
scholars have offered different explanations which highlight the role of culture 
(McAdam et al. 1996), the political system (Marwell and Oliver 1993), social networks 
(Gould 1993; 1995; Kim and Bearman 1997), the distribution of inequalities (Calhoun 
2015), the role of elites (Bearman 1993) and the role of technical devices (Marres 
2016). In this framework, class struggle, and indeed collective action in general, may 
emerge from very different contexts and institutions, and the mechanisms involved 
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may also vary considerably. Money can be one of these institutions: as the classical so-
ciologists demonstrated, money has the power to shape social interaction and to con-
tribute to social change (Simmel 1990 [1907]; see Bazzani 2020, chap. 2). Moreover, 
from a socio-technical perspective, money can also contribute to role distribution and 
it can influence the course of action.  
In this framework, collective action cannot be considered as a “toolbox” (Tilly 1978; 
Tarrow 1998; della Porta and Diani 2006) which is available for political activists to “uti-
lise”. The emergence of collective action and its political dimension does, in fact, re-
quire a sociological explanation before it can become a “tool". Continuing with the 
class struggle example, only a specific set of contextual elements (opportunities) will 
favour the emergence of class in se: at the very least, the belief that social change is 
possible and the desire for that change to come about need to emerge2. Belief that col-
lective action will achieve the desired outcomes is a requisite for undertaking action, 
even though these outcomes are often deferred to some future time and cannot be 
achieved by individual efforts. Individuals engaged in collective action will often not see 
the outcomes of their efforts. For example, they do not see these outcomes in the case 
of union strikes because political and contractual processes are often very lengthy, nor 
can they see them when the goal is sustainability for future generations: people’s belief 
in the outcomes of collective action rests on the hope that current actions will result in 
the expected effects in the future. Even though the causal link between present social 
action and future consequences is often not confirmed by empirical evidence (see 
Clarke et al. 2016, part. 1), the belief that it exists makes it possible for collective action 
to take place. Expected futures generate real effects that may be independent of the 
validity of the forecasting (Beckert 2016). The case of the mechanism of self-fulfilling 
prophecies is a clear example of the capacity of beliefs to produce real effects: when 
financial bubbles and crashes are predicted they often become reality because of the 
shared belief that they will happen. Aggregate effects of behaviour based on beliefs are 
real and the evidence of these effects tends to confirm the validity of these beliefs 
(Merton 1948). Beliefs are formed within a specific context, where institutions and rel-
evant players may have significant roles, for instance, where there is recourse to an ep-
istemic authority (Zagzebski 2015), but other mechanisms may also contribute to belief 
formation (Rydgren 2009): the most important of these are categorisation, analogy 
(Chwe 2001) and repeated observation and inference (Holland et al. 1986).  
The next section will present the Sardex CC and then discuss its effects on collective 
action and the mechanisms at work. 
 
2 For an introduction to this action model see Hedström 2005. 
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3. Sardex complementary currency 
 
Sardex is a business-to-business CC that was set up in Sardinia in 2009 and has since 
grown rapidly3. Sardex currency has the same value as the euro and it can only be used 
by Sardinian firms based in Sardinia and affiliated with the Sardex network. The com-
pany, Sardex Ltd, established in Sardinia in 2010, manages the lending service with 
about fifty employees and about fifty consultants. Credit is granted to Sardinian com-
panies to spend on buying products or services from other companies belonging to the 
Sardex network. When a company pays in Sardex, the company records a debit, 
equivalent to the value of the payment, on its account with the Sardex network. Debt is 
paid when other companies buy products in Sardex from the debtor. Interest is not ap-
plied to Sardex debts and credits. This Sardex zero-interest rate acts as an incentive to 
exchange goods and it also stimulates purchases. There is no incentive for companies 
to keep their Sardex balance positive because it does not generate interest. A member 
company's interests are best served by a balanced Sardex budget or by incurring Sar-
dex debt to make an interest-free investment in the company. Sardex, like other older 
CCs such as LETS and WIR, cannot be exchanged with the official currency.  
Companies pay Sardex Ltd an annual fee to be part of the network. The fee varies 
from € 200 for small cooperatives to € 3,000 for large companies. There is a clause in 
the Sardex Ltd statute which states that all profits must be reinvested in the company 
(Dini et al 2015: 27). The Sardex Ltd broker service helps members use the network to 
maximise the economic benefits for their business. More than 3,500 companies now 
 
3 The analysis uses thirty-seven semi-structured interview, conducted by the author in 2017, with entre-
preneurs who belong to the Sardex network (E) and a further eleven interviews, also conducted by the au-
thor, with Sardex managers and employees to better understand the functioning of key aspects of Sardex 
Ltd in the key areas of brokering, research and development, media, ICT and management. The sample of 
firms was differentiated according to the number of employees, the business sector, the year the firm 
joined Sardex and proximity to Cagliari, the regional capital. Interviews took place in person. The evalua-
tion included coding and categorizing (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). The interviews were conducted in Italian 
and explored basic topics which included the motivations for joining the Sardex network, relationships 
with other members, the economic effects of joining Sardex for the company and entrepreneurs' personal 
opinions of the Sardex project. The interview questions were designed to be open and flexible so as to al-
low participants to drive the interview focus (Crouch & McKenzie 2006). Most of the information and data 
collected were inserted into a numerical matrix with 151 variables, while the qualitative part was tran-
scribed and coded. The data were coded according to grounded methods (Charmaz 2006; Corbin and 
Strauss 1990) which made it possible to use the entrepreneurs’ perceptions to formulate the theoretical 
framework which has guided this study/research. Open codes were grouped and refined into focused cat-
egories using NVivo software. For an extensive analysis of the interviews see Bazzani 2020a. 
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belong to the Sardex network and all of them have experienced appreciable growth 
rates. 
A group of adviser promotes Sardex among Sardinian firms although businesses can 
also independently submit a request to join the Sardex network. When a business does 
this, the Sardex brokers assess whether or not that business complements current Sar-
dex market requirements. If the evaluation is positive, the firm receives a credit line to 
start buying and selling in the network. The value of the credit line extended to the 
business is decided by the Sardex brokers and it is a fraction of the firm's annual turno-
ver in euros. A firm's business in Sardex is complementary to its euro business, so initial 
credit lines are usually around 10% of a firm's annual turnover. A firm can buy goods 
and services and its Sardex balance can remain negative up to its credit line limit. Sar-
dex debt has to be repaid within a year by selling the firm's goods and services to other 
network members. If the debt is not repaid within that time Sardex Ltd may request 
that it be repaid in euros. Sardex money is primarily a medium of exchange: it is not a 
store of value but rather a tool for facilitating investment and transactions. The Sardex 
currency has a fixed exchange rate and is not convertible so the function of money as a 
unit of account remains with the euro. 
After joining the network, firms open an account on the Sardex online platform and 
start using the services provided. This online platform offers: 
 • a list of the firms that are members of the Sardex network which provides infor-
mation on their location and the products/services they buy and sell; 
 • a personal page on the Sardex platform for making offers or promoting products; 
 • a Sardex Facebook page for interacting with other members or for promoting 
products or marketing events; 
 • an online web platform for making payments in Sardex. These payments can also 
be made using a Sardex mobile phone app. 
Sardex Ltd is organised around its various areas of activity, each of which is dedicat-
ed to providing a particular service to the Sardex network. The tasks performed by the 
research and development, ICT, media and advisory teams are similar to those of other 
service companies but the broker service provided by Sardex Ltd is truly innovative. 
Broker management closely supervises the Sardex market and the broker service in-
cludes a call centre for members who can ask their broker to assist them in sourcing 
suppliers of specific goods or services; members can also obtain expert advice on mar-
ket trends and receive suggestions regarding marketing strategies. The broker service is 
very effective in promoting transactions among members. 
Some of the features of the Sardex CC make it stand out: 
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- Origin and purposes: the founding of Sardex is linked to a desire for the 
collective civic redemption of Sardinia, an economically backward region; this 
desire was expressed by a small group of young locals, who at that time had 
mostly emigrated to Northern European countries. The Sardex project is an ex-
ample of self-empowerment of a depressed region, activated independently of 
central or local regulatory institutions. 
- Tradition and innovation: Sardex adopts interesting aspects of success-
ful CCs of the past, in particular, the WIR (Switzerland), set up after the Great 
Depression of '29 and still active as a bank and LETS, created in Canada during 
the crisis of the '80s. The Sardex synthesis, though, is innovative because i) it 
uses the advantages of ITC; ii) it is supported by a service company (Sardex Ltd) 
that promote the currency and can cope with the decline of volunteer enthusi-
asm which negatively impacts other local CCs. 
- Currency design: i) the Sardex discourages accumulation and promotes 
the circulation of goods and money within the region (the Sardex circulates ten 
times faster than the euro (Sartori and Dini 2016: 278); ii) payments are certain 
and immediate; iii) all transactions are traced and tax evasion is impossible. 
- Social effects described in the literature refer to Sardex as a device ca-
pable of fostering a sense of public interest in the local community among its 
member companies. Individual utility and social value seem to coalesce in the 
user’s awareness of the positive effects of Sardex on the local community (Lit-
tera et al. 2014: 17). 
- Spread: Sardex now has more than three thousand companies and its 
members conduct transactions worth forty eighty million Sardex every year. 
CCs with similar characteristics to Sardex have been adopted in twelve other 
Italian regions and similar projects have been developed in France, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Spain. 
 
 
4. How money shapes beliefs: the emergence of the collective 
 
Sardex was created and developed during a period when Sardinia and other 
regions and countries throughout the world were suffering a severe economic 
crisis. Compared to the Northern Italian regions, Sardinia has always lacked a 
strong industrial sector and for the last twenty years Sardinian businesses have 
been pressured by external competition from larger and better organised com-
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panies. The 2008 economic crisis and the years that followed fostered a sense 
of economic decline and the economic expectations of Sardinian entrepreneurs 
became very negative. Many entrepreneurs who are members of the Sardex 
network saw the Sardex currency as an opportunity to contrast this decline: 
 
I joined Sardex to get around the growing crisis and I must say 
I was right. This allowed me to save myself and attract new 
customers to counteract the loss of those who use the internet 
or who only care about price and not service. It is not these 
people’s fault, because the system doesn’t leave them much 
money and prices are all aligned in a downward direction. 
Workers and entrepreneurs are doing without the profit mar-
gins required for a company to exist. Twenty years ago, a 
company with my turnover, managed to feed 4/5 people 
without any problems. Today I can barely manage with just 
my son. The gross operating margin has decreased and con-
sequently the net operating margin has also decreased. The 
State doesn’t believe this is my real net operating margin, and 
I am told it is impossible and that I am cheating. A tragedy. 
This is everyone’s condition: it is Europe that is in this situa-
tion. In a while Germany will also fall into this situation be-
cause poverty is born of poverty. If we don’t get it into our 
heads to make our small businesses grow again and give val-
ue to our work, we won’t get out of this situation. With Sardex 
our work is valued (E.15). 
 
This entrepreneur sees national and supra-national institutions as something 
that extract value from his work and business: he does not perceive them as 
providing security and opportunities but rather as a threat to his life. For vari-
ous reasons, most of the entrepreneurs in the sample have no access to bank 
credit: some lack collateral, others have recently established businesses, etc. 
Entrepreneurs who do have access to bank credit consider it unfair that banks 
borrow money from citizens and central banks at almost zero interest, but lend 
it to entrepreneurs at very high interest rates, sometimes as high as 10% when 
banking fees are included:  
  
Partecipazione e conflitto, 13(1) 2020: 438-461, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v13i1p438 
  
448 
 
We don’t use traditional credit. We didn’t ask for it, we need-
ed it in some periods, but I don’t consider the banks to be 
trustworthy. Not because they might fail but because nowa-
days banks’ intentions are not to help customers prosper, but 
to damage them. We have a traditional bank account, but I 
see that there is no interest in increasing a customer’s wealth, 
but only to make sure the figures are correct and that every-
thing is precise, and the right procedures adhered to. Today 
the situation does not allow companies to be in top form, I 
don’t see the banks providing any assistance to companies, 
quite the opposite. Sardex, though, sustains companies by of-
fering them credit lines (E.31). 
 
In this situation, entrepreneurs increasingly feel they have been abandoned to face 
the competition from big global companies by themselves. In their eyes, institutions 
which should be supporting their economic activities do not seem to be fulfilling their 
promises, or, even worse, they are perceived to be creating obstacles for local entre-
preneurs.  
The basic difference between Sardex and the euro is that Sardex cannot 
“move” outside Sardinia: it can only be exchanged among network members, all 
of whom live in Sardinia. However, this basic rule alone is not enough to estab-
lish a different functioning and perception of the economic system. Entrepre-
neurs experience at least three main differences in the way Sardex functions. 
The first difference that entrepreneurs see when doing business in Sardex 
comes from their first encounter with this currency: Sardex Ltd does not ask for 
collateral when it makes Sardex credit available to entrepreneurs, nor does it 
charge a high interest rate. Sardex credit costs firms an annual membership fee, 
which is very low when compared to the cost of bank credit. The creditworthi-
ness of firms in the Sardex network is assessed on the basis of their capacity to 
exchange goods and services within the network: the more the products and 
services offered by a potential member are required by other network mem-
bers, the greater will be the firm's ability to repay its debt (for details see 
Bazzani 2020, chapter 3). Entrepreneurs perceive that Sardex Ltd places a high 
level of trust in them.  
The second difference that entrepreneurs perceive when doing business in Sardex 
comes from their first meeting with other members. From the day a firm joins the Sar-
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dex network, the broker office works to spread this information among other mem-
bers. It is common for new firms to receive calls for quotes from other members or 
have new customers arrive in their shop/office on the same day they join the Sardex 
network. These relationships cause new members to perceive the Sardex network as 
different: 
 
The first exchanges in Sardex were positive because negotia-
tions started differently. Relations with companies in Sardex 
have well identified values: trust, a desire for reciprocity, and 
to help the network grow, improve negotiations and relations. 
(E.9). 
 
Entrepreneurs report how there is a sense of belonging within the Sardex network 
which is lacking in ordinary economic transactions. Unlike transactions carried out in 
euros, “there is always something to talk about” in Sardex: people usually share opin-
ions on other Sardex suppliers or talk about marketing strategies. 
From the beginning, entrepreneurs perceive that relationships in Sardex are differ-
ent, thanks to Sardex Ltd and to the behaviour of other members. From these experi-
ences, members develop a belief that people in the Sardex network are highly reliable 
and can be trusted when carrying out economic transactions. Entrepreneurs rapidly 
start to expect that all other members of the Sardex network will possess similar char-
acteristics, thanks to the categorization mechanism. These expectations are confirmed 
during subsequent economic exchanges, where experiences of cheating on product 
quality or delaying payment are very rare: this is the third relevant difference that en-
trepreneurs experience in the Sardex network. During the economic recession entre-
preneurs became extremely suspicious regarding the real intentions of their custom-
ers. They report how they had to spend much of their time collecting payments from 
their customers: with the crisis delayed payments became increasingly frequent which 
meant entrepreneurs spent a lot of time chasing their debtors. This does not happen in 
the Sardex network because there are effective systems of direct and horizontal moni-
toring and sanctioning in place (see Bazzani 2020, chapter 4). Defections from the co-
operative behaviour expected in economic exchanges are very rare in the Sardex net-
work. 
Thanks to these three differences that Sardex members experience within 
their network, they soon start to consider this type of economic functioning as a 
“different” way of making money and doing business compared to the euro sys-
tem:  
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Sardex gives a sense of belonging that is missing today. Mem-
bers recognise that the Sardex project gives them a chance of 
keeping their money here. This is the basic mission that mem-
bers recognise in the Sardex project, then soon this mission is 
transformed into relations between people who trust each 
other. This is a condition never experienced in any other type 
of economic operation. For work I have visited over a thou-
sand companies, but a situation of this kind is absolutely 
unique in history, an incredible demolition of barriers. Sardex 
is an element of commonality that encourages you to share 
experiences. The positive experiences you make in the net-
work reinforce this image (E.34). 
 
These experiences make members realise that money can function in differ-
ent ways and that in Sardex the principle that “our money stays here” is accom-
panied by “fair” behaviour in economic transactions and by a sense of “familiar-
ity” among members: 
 
In Sardex we are a kind of brotherhood, a trade union, a pri-
vate club, we all feel like one family and, in the end, this 
makes us frighteningly loyal in our purchases and it also 
means we create friendships. We all share the hope of being 
able to change something in this economic system which pe-
nalises those who work, and which has increased the distance 
between those who have enough money and those who do 
not. Sardex is a payment system that gives you the chance to 
make a living. It shortens distances (E.15). 
 
The functioning of Sardex is a complex mix of technical characteristics and 
activated social mechanisms. The effect on beliefs is that users begin to see 
Sardex money as a less abstract mediator of economic life than ordinary money. 
Ordinary euro money comes from banks and can “fly” away from Sardinia with 
financial products, while Sardex money “remains” in Sardinia and generates a 
“different” mode of money and economic functioning.  
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This positive perception is confirmed by the increasing turnover of firms us-
ing Sardex (Bazzani 2020) and also produces a shift in the way people use mon-
ey. In time of crisis, Sardex entrepreneurs tend to reduce investment and they 
cut back on their personal consumption. Sardex money cannot be used for pay-
ing taxes or electricity bills, but only for buying products and services from oth-
er members. This condition generates a different feeling when using Sardex 
money—Sardex is a “lighter” currency: 
 
In the periods when I know I cannot spend euros, I have the 
opportunity to spend in Sardex. Euros are always needed for 
specific things, like taxes. If I need to buy something and I 
can’t spend in euros, then I use Sardex. For example, a few 
days ago it was my daughter’s birthday, we went to the res-
taurant opposite, with all the family, to celebrate and I paid in 
Sardex. In euro I wouldn’t have done it because I would have 
thought about it a thousand times before. Nowadays, we 
have to think a lot before spending euros (E.29). 
 
 
5. Sardex and collective action 
 
The differences between how the euro and the Sardex currencies function 
tend to become a model for the entrepreneurs that orientates orientates eco-
nomic functioning towards supporting the local economy: 
 
Sardex provides benefits for our territory because the money 
stays here, with salaries and taxes. The greater the number of 
Sardinian companies working, the greater the benefits for 
Sardinia (E.19). 
Using Sardex … has the effect of increasing monetary circula-
tion and purchasing power because there are companies, pro-
fessionals and artisans that are increasing their turnover. The 
positive effect on my activity and on the local economy have 
made me judge Sardex more favourably (E.14). 
With Sardex I keep the product in our region. It is easy to buy 
online, on the internet, but with Sardex we keep the product 
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in our region, and we don’t need to look for it elsewhere … It is 
also a way to support the Sardinian economy and the smaller 
economies (E.27). 
 
Entrepreneurs join Sardex mostly because they want to use it to increase 
their business and deal with the economic crisis. Then while they are using Sar-
dex for their transactions, they start to perceive the different value(s) of the 
Sardex network compared with the euro. This process can be clearly observed 
in the shift in the motivation for joining and using Sardex. In the sample, half 
the entrepreneurs cite the ethical value of Sardex as their principal motive for 
continuing to use it: they joined the network to increase their business but they 
remain members also for ethical reasons (tab. 1). 
 
Table 1: Motivations for joining and using Sardex provided by the entrepreneurs sampled. 
 
 Business Ethical Both 
Joining 31 4 2 
Using 17 3 17 
 
 
Entrepreneurs believe Sardex benefits not only their own business but the 
whole economic system of their region. This is the ethical value that they asso-
ciate with using Sardex but not with using the euro: local circulation of money 
favours local businesses and the overall development of the region. This is the 
key passage where, in the view of the entrepreneurs, individual utility also be-
come a collective goal. In this way, entrepreneurs continue using Sardex be-
cause it enriches their businesses, but also because they believe it contributes 
to the wellbeing of their region. It could also be argued, though, that increasing 
the quantity of euro currency in circulation might also benefit the regional 
economy. But entrepreneurs do not attribute a collective goal to the use of the 
euro, which, compared with Sardex, is seen as connected to some “impersonal” 
market that is supposed to regulate it. Sardex is regulated by people you can 
meet and all the money circulation is tracked and cannot move outside the re-
gion. While the euro is commonly associated with impersonal or supranational 
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forces, Sardex money has a local dimension and is regulated by people who are 
well known to them. Entrepreneurs feel that they are part of the Sardex project 
and that they can influence its development. 
Sardex creates a new form of community (Bazzani 2020b) that did not previ-
ously exist. This community is characterised by money circulation, regional geo-
graphical boundaries and economic entrepreneurship. In this community, 
members believe in a collective goal (regional socio-economic development) 
and in the capacity of each member to contribute to reaching these goals. 
Members also use Sardex because they recognise that the project has a collec-
tive goal.  
Evidence of the collective orientation comes not only from entrepreneurs’ 
self-reported beliefs, but also from their behaviour. Entrepreneurs prefer to use 
Sardex rather than euros for their expenses because of its ethical value and 
they also often promote Sardex among their acquaintances encouraging them 
to join the network. The more entrepreneurs associate Sardex with ethical val-
ues and collective goals, the more they promote it among their personal net-
work, some of them quite enthusiastically. Sardex Ltd has a team of advisors 
that visit Sardinian firms and promote membership. The entrepreneurs who 
willingly promote membership among their personal network, usually do not 
usually benefit in any way from the new firms which join the Sardex network. It 
can be argued, though, that in some cases having more firms in the network is 
advantageous for members because it increases opportunities, especially when 
the newly recruited firms are in the same area. In this case, it would be difficult 
to prove that recruiting was animated by a collective goal, though the tradition-
al interpretation of collective goals being met as a secondary effect of individual 
profit would valid. However, Sardex members’ behaviour show how entrepre-
neurs often promote the Sardex network without any expected direct gain, but 
only because of the network’s intrinsic value: 
 
I talk in my shop with Sardex customers, I explain how it works 
and, when they tell me they would like to join, I call the bro-
kers and tell them to visit them. For example, there is a really 
nice toy shop, I talked to [the owner] for a year to persuade 
him to join and now he is really happy. Now he complains that 
he would have liked to join the network earlier. I always ad-
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vise trying it for a year, if you realise that it doesn’t work for 
you, then don’t renew your membership. But they have all 
remained, even the creche. Our creche and kindergarten are 
both in Sardex (E.18). 
 
This entrepreneur has no need to use the services provided by the creche 
and kindergarten and nor do her relatives. She promotes the network only be-
cause she believes that expanding the Sardex network has an intrinsic value. 
However, there are also some cases in which the Sardex network is still used for 
collective goals, but not for its intrinsic features: among the entrepreneurs, 
there is some occasional pro-social behaviour oriented towards helping people 
impacted by natural disasters. In these cases, the Sardex network is used as a 
tool for collecting funds to support these disaster victims. 
Entrepreneurs associate business conducted using Sardex with positive collective 
socio-economic effects: half of the entrepreneurs sampled use Sardex currency not on-
ly to improve their business but also to contribute to the socio-economic development 
of their region. This is not the case with business conducted in euros. So, using Sardex 
starts to become a form of collective action among entrepreneurs. 
 
 
6. Conclusion: money as a political project 
 
The Sardex project was created to support the local economy and local busi-
nesses. Entrepreneurs perceive that this currency helps them face competition 
coming from larger, better organised companies based in other Italian or Euro-
pean regions. Sardex creates and redistributes business opportunities, thanks to 
an interest-free credit system, a rapidly circulating currency, the broker service 
and the “different” type of economic and social relationship within the Sardex 
network. From their first day in the Sardex network, entrepreneurs receive calls 
from new customers and they perceive the presence of fair behaviour, high lev-
els of trust and a cooperative attitude within the Sardex market: 
 
In the Sardex network you find entrepreneurs with whom it is easy to 
have social goals … A strange vibe is created in Sardex, it is all about 
demolishing walls and it works towards that. The walls don’t get de-
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molished because the system works, but the system works because 
the walls are demolished. It is a reversal of cause and effect. In a 
normal economy, relationships are usually good because the econo-
my is working well, here it is the opposite: the economy works be-
cause relationships are good (E. 34). 
 
This different experience of economic relationships within the Sardex net-
work shapes a new perception of how the economic system functions. Entre-
preneurs using Sardex believe that their economic activity has both individual 
and collective benefits. Sardex money is not only seen as a tool for increasing 
company business because entrepreneurs feel that using Sardex has the effect 
of directly augmenting collective well-being. Individual and collective benefits 
co-exist in the use of Sardex. 
The entrepreneurial activity of "doing business" and collective action are 
forms of social action that are traditionally kept separate. In the mainstream 
economic narrative, entrepreneurs should not care about the secondary conse-
quences of their business—their sole objective should be to increase their prof-
its: politics and society at large should care about the other issues. Positive col-
lective outcomes should be delivered as secondary effects from the firms’ 
struggles to remain competitive on the market and their capacity to innovate. 
The free circulation of money is a crucial tool for facilitating exchanges and in-
creasing competition among economic players. Indeed, the free movement of 
money, goods, services and people was at the heart of the European integration 
project and, specifically, of the European Monetary Union and the euro (Münch 
2008: 528; Schmidt-Wellenburg 2017, Emerson 1992). Encouraging competition 
with the free movement of goods, services, capital and people is expected to 
provide mutual benefits for European countries in the long run. In the short 
term there is increasing inequality among countries and between strong and 
weak businesses. Waiting for the expected long-term benefits of market com-
petition for all countries, politics and individuals need to cope with the side ef-
fects of the markets: i.e. unemployment should be tackled using European and 
national public investments or with individual emigration (Streeck 2015). The 
common market union and the euro project were built with the same goal of 
reducing transaction costs and reinforcing competition (Feldstein 1997; 
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Goodhart 1998; Bohle 2009; Hopkin and Blyth 2012) and the expected second-
ary effects were to favour the consolidation of a European identity and real Eu-
ropean political integration. Unfortunately these simple assumptions did not 
produce clear outcomes: the real effects of the process are complex and still 
under debate (Peersman and Smets 2005; Bartram and Karolyi 2006; Papaioan-
nou and Portes 2008; Matthijs and Blyth 2015). Unexpected negative political 
tendencies are emerging: nationalism is rising in European countries (Lubbers 
and Coenders 2017) as is internal and external migration pressure on the EU 
(Trenz and Triandafyllidou 2017) and there have been unexpected redistribu-
tion effects (Cour-Thimann 2013; Enderlein 2006).  
Unlike the euro, Sardex takes money out of the neutral arena of economic competi-
tion and places it in the political arena. Entrepreneurs using Sardex do not demand lo-
cal development, occupation and economic wellbeing as the expected long-term bene-
fit of international market competition, but they are directly engaged in supporting and 
promoting Sardex money for these goals. At a time when the regulation of money sup-
ply and circulation is subjected to impersonal external forces (i.e. the markets) that it 
seems no-one can change, Sardex money restores monetary regulation to a local scale. 
At this level, users perceive that they can influence monetary circulation in a way that 
could assist self-development within their region. As they use Sardex money, entrepre-
neurs start considering this currency as a tool for directly intervening in redistributive 
processes and supporting the entire regional economy. The distinction between indi-
vidual and collective well-being becomes blurred and entrepreneurs start to see their 
business in Sardex as something with clear and valuable collective goals. This is a form 
of collective action oriented towards the production of a collective good, identified as 
the socio-economic development of the region. This collective action is carried out in 
ordinary economic transactions and it can also take the form of promoting network 
membership without any direct economic gain. There are also some occasional philan-
thropic initiatives among members. 
In conclusion, it can be noted that the emergence of collective action in the Sardex 
network is not the effect of particular individual characteristics or political strategies of 
economic activism generating extraordinary events, but rather, it is the effect of con-
textual elements related to the characteristics and functioning of the currency. These 
elements guide social interaction so that, at the aggregate level, collective action ori-
ented towards the production of a common good can be observed. 
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